Our paper explores the link between cross-sectional fund return dispersion and performance evaluation. The foundation of our model is the simple intuition that in periods of high return dispersion, it is easier for unskilled managers to disguise themselves as skilled. Indeed, in a world of little or no dispersion, it is obvious who is skilled and unskilled. Rational investors should then apply higher discounts to performance in high dispersion environments. Our empirical results support this prediction. Using fund flow data, we show that a one-standard deviation increase in return dispersion causes a 11%-17% decline in flow-performance sensitivity.
Introduction
There is a remarkable consensus as a result of 50 years' research on the performance of active mutual funds: the vast majority do not outperform. The evidence is consistent across three separate strands of the literature: the hypothesis testing literature, the literature on classifying funds into different performance groups, and the Bayesian performance evaluation literature.
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Our idea is to probe deeper into the decision making of investors, who face the problem of sorting out the good from the majority of non-performing funds. These investors do not want to make a Type I error (investing in a bad asset manager) but they also do not want to miss a good manager (Type II error). In this context, we show that cross-sectional dispersion of manager returns is an important state variable that influences the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors, and argue that it is key side information that investors use. When there is high cross-sectional dispersion, it is easy for unskilled managers to be disguised as skilled, making it difficult for investors to figure out who is skilled. As a result, rational investors are skeptical about funds that appear to be outperforming.
Motivated by the literature on classifying funds into performance groups (Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 2010 , Ferson and Chen, 2017 , and Harvey and Liu, 2017b , we build a model that assumes that fund alphas are drawn from several subpopulations, with one subpopulation being the zero-alpha population. In addition, we assume that the majority of funds come from the zero-alpha population, consistent with the main finding of the performance evaluation literature. In this setup, zero-alpha funds can still generate a non-zero estimated alpha by taking on idiosyncratic risk over a given period of time. We show that the average level of idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds, which is closely related to cross-sectional return dispersion, determines the amount of shrinkage that rational investors apply to discount the alphas of outperforming funds.
2 A higher level of idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds (equivalently, a higher level of return dispersion) makes it easier for these funds 1 See Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) , Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) , Fama and French (2010) , and Harvey and Liu (2017a) for the hypothesis testing literature, Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) , Ferson and Chen (2017) , and Harvey and Liu (2017b) for the literature on classifying funds into performance groups, and Baks, Metrick, and Wachter (2001) , Pastor and Stambaugh (2002a) , Jones and Shanken (2005) , Avramov and Wermers (2006) , Busse and Irvine (2006) , Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) , and Harvey and Liu (2017b) for the Bayesian performance evaluation literature.
2 The shrinkage of fund alphas is the key insight highlighted by both the Bayesian performance evaluation literature (e.g., Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002a , Jones and Shanken, 2005 , Avramov and Wermers (2006 , Busse and Irvine (2006) , and Harvey and Liu, 2017b ) and the hypothesis testing literature (e.g., Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White, 2006 , Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 2010 , and Fama and French, 2010 . 1 to generate superior performance based on luck alone, leading investors to be more skeptical of outperforming funds and consequently discount fund alphas more harshly.
While our model provides unambiguous predictions about how the average level of idiosyncratic risk among zero-alpha funds affects performance evaluation, we cannot directly observe the level since we do not know which funds are zero-alpha funds in the first place. We propose to represent the level of idiosyncratic risk with a simple metric: the inter-quartile range (IQR) of the cross-section of all fund returns. We argue that IQR is intuitively appealing as it succinctly captures the range of performance among funds -most of which, given the prior literature, are mediocre performers, at best. As such, it gives investors a sense of the variation of performance to expect based on luck alone.
We provide simulation-based evidence that shows a very high time-series correlation between IQR and the average level of idiosyncratic risk among zero-alpha funds. Using IQR as a proxy for return dispersion, we test the main prediction of our model by examining the relation between future fund flows and past fund performances, that is, flow-performance sensitivity. We show that return dispersion negatively affects flow-performance sensitivity. The impact is economically significant: a one-standard deviation increase in return dispersion reduces flow-performance sensitivity by 11%-17%, depending on the benchmark model we use to estimate alphas. Hence, our paper provides direct flow-based evidence on the relevance of the inference problems highlighted by the aforementioned three strands of literature from a revealed-preference perspective (Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2016, Barber, Huang, and Odean, 2016) .
Our paper is related to and motivated by the recent literature on performance evaluation.
First of all, our model can be interpreted within a hypothesis testing framework, following Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006) , Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) , Fama and French (2010) , and Harvey and Liu (2017a) . These papers study performance evaluation from a multiple testing perspective, arguing that outperforming funds must surpass a statistical threshold that is tougher than the usual threshold to declare significance due to the large number of funds in the cross-section. We show that return dispersion affects this threshold. Everything else equal, a higher return dispersion makes it easier for a typical zero-alpha fund to be cloaked as a fund with skill, resulting in a higher Type I error (i.e., falsely identifying zero-alpha funds as good). As a result, rational investors who take return dispersion into account will apply a tougher threshold before allocating to funds.
Our model can also be understood within a Bayesian framework. In fact, we cast our model within a Bayesian framework to obtain analytical tractability. Suppose investors view fund managers as coming from several subpopulations, with α 0 = 0 (zero-alpha population) being one of them. In this setup, we show that key to Bayesian investors' decision-making is their prior on the average level of idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds, which is the main driver of cross-sectional return dispersion.
A higher prior leads to a lower posterior mean for funds with large (positive) alphas, implying a more aggressive discount of the alphas for these funds and thus a weaker flow-performance sensitivity. Our model thus differs from existing Bayesian models such as Jones and Shanken (2005) and Harvey and Liu (2017b) by focusing on the implications of risk-taking for a large group of managers, i.e., managers with a zero alpha.
Lastly, our paper also complements the literature that tries to model the crosssection of fund performances by classifying funds into distinct performance groups, such as Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010) , Ferson and Chen (2017) , and Harvey and Liu (2017b) . On the one hand, we build on the premise that the majority of funds have a zero alpha, which is consistent with the previous empirical consensus. On the other hand, while these papers focus on the estimation of the cross-sectional distribution of fund performance, we pay particular attention to the role of return dispersion in influencing the classification of funds.
Importantly, instead of trying to infer the cross-sectional distribution of skill from an econometrician's perspective (as the aforementioned three strands of literature does), we follow the recent literature on revealed preference (Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2016, Barber, Huang, and Odean, 2016) to test the predictions of our model. As such, we are able to tell what information motivates investors from a real-world asset allocation perspective.
Our paper also adds to the recent literature that takes a deeper look at flowperformance sensitivity. Franzoni and Schmalz (2017) study how uncertainty about risk loadings on benchmark factors affects investors' capital allocation decisions. Starks and Sun (2017) examine the implications of economic policy uncertainty on flow-performance sensitivity. Different from these papers, we focus on cross-sectional return dispersion. Empirically, we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of the variables in Franzoni and Schmalz and Starks and Sun.
Finally, while our paper focuses on a single important variable -return dispersion -that appears to influence investors' capital allocation decisions, there are potentially many candidate variables that might drive from the previous literature on performance evaluation. While past research focuses on what investors should do to evaluate fund managers, our paper provides an example that illustrates what investors are actually doing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model that links return dispersion to flow-performance sensitivity. Section 3 tests our model predictions by examining flow-performance sensitivity empirically. Some concluding remarks are offered in the final section.
Model

A Simple Model on Return Dispersion
We present a model that links cross-sectional return dispersion to individual funds' performance by drawing on insights from the previous literature on performance evaluation. In particular, we assume that the population of fund managers consists of several subpopulations, each subpopulation taking a specific value of alpha (Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 2010 , Ferson and Chen, 2017 , Harvey and Liu, 2017b . This view of the population of funds provides a convenient yet realistic way to classify funds into different performance groups. Meanwhile, building on the insights from the literature that use hypothesis testing to evaluate funds' performance (Kosowski et al., 2006 , Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 2010 , Fama and French, 2010 , we assume that the majority of funds have an alpha that is indistinguishable from zero. Finally, following the Bayesian performance evaluation literature (Baks, Metrick, and Wachter, 2001 , Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002 , Harvey and Liu, 2017b , we study the inference problem faced by Bayesian investors who learn about manager skill from the cross-section of funds.
More specifically, for now we assume that investors view fund managers as coming from two subpopulations: one with α 0 = 0 and the other with α h > 0 ('h' stands for high alpha). By observing a fund's return history over the past T periods, investors try to infer whether the fund has no skill (i.e., α 0 = 0) or has skill (i.e., α h > 0). The prior masses of the two subpopulations are Π 0 and Π h , with Π 0 + Π h = 1. Note that our model abstracts from two complications that arise in performance evaluation. First, while there is controversy over the number of subpopulations that best describe the cross-section of funds (Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 2010 , Ferson and Chen, 2017 , Harvey and Liu, 2017b , we use the two-group classification as an illustration. Our model can be easily extended to accommodate more than two groups of managers. Second, we abstract from issues related to the adjustment for benchmark risk factors. One can think of the alphas in our model as the factor adjusted alphas.
For the group of funds that have no skill, they can still generate a non-zero return because of idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, intuitively, the cross-sectional dispersion of returns across all funds should be positively correlated with the mean level of idiosyncratic risk. While we examine the cross-sectional dispersion of returns in our empirical analysis, our model focuses on idiosyncratic risk for analytical tractability. We later provide simulation-based evidence that shows that the cross-sectional dispersion of returns indeed has a strong positive correlation with the mean level of idiosyncratic risk. We thus view cross-sectional return dispersion and the average level of idiosyncratic risk as interchangeable in our modeling framework.
To model the cross-sectional distribution of idiosyncratic risk, we assume that the prior distribution (from the investors' perspective) of idiosyncratic risk conditional on α 0 is given by an inverse-gamma distribution IG(λ, θ 0 ), where λ is the shape parameter and θ 0 is the scale parameter.
3 The inverse-gamma distribution is a standard conjugate prior for the variance parameter in Bayesian analysis. We adopt it to obtain a posterior distribution that is analytically tractable. The main message of our model applies when we use other distributions.
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Similarly, we assume that the prior distribution of idiosyncratic risk conditional on α h is given by another inverse-gamma distribution IG(λ, θ h ). Notice that, for simplicity, we assume that this inverse-gamma distribution shares the same shape parameter with the prior distribution under α 0 = 0. This allows us to focus on the scale parameters (i.e., θ 0 and θ h ) that model the means of the inverse-gamma distributions. Throughout our analysis, we will fix λ and explore the variation in θ 0 and θ h in affecting performance evaluation.
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Finally, conditional on α and σ, we assume that a fund's returns follow i.i.d. normal distribution with mean α and standard deviation σ. As such, the conditional likelihood function of a fund's returns over the past is given by:
where R = (R 1 , R 2 , ..., . . . , R T ) is the vector of fund returns (note that we suppress the fund subscript as we are considering a generic fund).
To summarize our model assumptions: investors have a dichotomous prior on fund alphas (i.e., α 0 = 0 vs. α h ), with the corresponding probability masses of Π 0 and Π h . Conditional on the level of alpha, the prior distribution on σ is either IG(λ, θ 0 ) (if α 0 ) or IG(λ, θ h ) (if α h ). Investors observe a fund's returns over the past T periods and try to make inference on alpha by combining information in the data and the prior.
Under the above assumptions, we first derive the (posterior) distribution for a fund's alpha. The following proposition establishes this.
3 The probability density function for the inverse-gamma distribution
Its mean is θ0 λ−1 for λ > 1. 4 When non-conjugate priors are used, the posterior distribution, which is on longer analytically tractable, can be obtained through the Gibbs sampling, see, e.g., Jones and Shanken (2005) .
5 The main message of our model applies when we have both subpopulation-specific shape parameter λ and scale parameter θ. Given our interest in the mean of the population of idiosyncratic risk, we fix one parameter (i.e., λ) and focus on the variation in the other parameter (i.e., θ). Proposition 1. The posterior probability distribution for a fund's alpha is given by:
is the fund's mean return and
is the fund's standard deviation. The posterior mean (i.e., E(α|R)) is therefore p(α h |R)α h .
Note that since there is no risk adjustment in the basic presentation of our model, IV OL is the same as the standard deviation of returns.
To gain insights into Proposition 1, it is helpful to consider a special case. Assuming θ 0 = θ h (the same prior dispersion of returns across the two groups of funds), then it is straightforward to show that p(α h |R) is decreasing in IV OL ifR > α h /2 and increasing in IV OL ifR < α h /2. This result can be interpreted in a hypothesis testing framework as in Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010) . When R > α h /2, we may consider classifying the fund as a good fund. However, we are worried about the Type I error, that is, falsely classifying a zero-alpha fund as a good fund. An increase in the fund's IV OL exacerbates this concern and leads us to reduce p(α h |R). Similarly, whenR < α h /2, we are likely to classify the fund as a zero-alpha fund. But in this situation, we are concerned about the Type II error. An increase in the fund's IV OL makes us less confident in classifying the fund as a zero-alpha fund, resulting in an increase in p(α h |R).
In the context of our paper, we are more interested in the comparative statics related to θ 0 and θ h . Our next proposition establishes these. Proposition 2. For each level of IV OL, there exists a lower bound onR (denoted asR * ) such that whenR >R * , we have:
We again use the intuition from a hypothesis testing framework to interpret Proposition 2.
For the population of funds with a zero alpha, a higher θ 0 is associated with a higher dispersion of fund returns in the cross-section, which creates difficulty for investors to tell the good from the bad. More specifically, everything else equal, a higher θ 0 makes it easier for a typical zero-alpha fund to be disguised as a fund with skill, resulting in a higher Type I error (i.e., falsely identifying zero-alpha funds as good) for investors if they do not take into account the change in θ 0 . Equivalently, assuming that investors have information about θ 0 and incorporate this information into their priors, they will discount fund alphas more harshly (i.e., a lower E(α|R)) when θ 0 becomes higher in order to reduce Type I error. This is the main hypothesis that we test in our empirical analysis.
A similar intuition applies to θ h . For the population of funds with a positive alpha (i.e., α h ), a higher θ h results in a higher dispersion of fund returns among positivealpha funds, which means that a larger fraction of these funds will have bad luck and generate a return that is closer to α 0 = 0 rather than to α h . As a result, everything else equal, a higher θ h results in a higher Type II error (i.e., falsely identifying a good fund as having a zero alpha) for investors if they do not take into account the change in θ h . If investors have information about the change in θ h , they will discount fund alphas less harshly (i.e., a higher E(α|R)) corresponding to an increase in θ h in order to reduce Type II error.
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Lastly, we establish the comparative statics for IV OL.
Proposition 3. Fixing θ 0 and θ h , there exists a lower bound onR (denoted asR † )
such that whenR >R † , we have:
The intuition for this result is previewed in the discussion of Proposition 1. For funds with a large enoughR, although we are inclined to classify these funds as α = α h , we are concerned about the Type I error and will lower E(α|R) if IV OL increases.
Notice that Proposition 3 is different from the usual result that the appraisal ratios and t-statistics -commonly used performance metrics to take risk into accountare negatively correlated with IV OL.
7 Our result in Proposition 3 makes a statement about the estimated alpha in level, as opposed to the alpha scaled by IV OL as in appraisal ratios and t-statistics. However, in our empirical analysis when study flowperformance sensitivity, we are not able to distinguish between Proposition 3 and the risk channel (i.e., less flow goes to funds with a higher level of IV OL, holding alpha constant). We therefore list Proposition 3 for completeness and point out that the impact of IV OL on alpha in level as documented in Proposition 3 may reinforce the risk channel, for which we may not be able to distinguish empirically.
Model Calibration
We perform a calibration exercise for our model. We set the scale parameters θ 0 and θ h at different levels and examine how changes in them influence the relation between E(α|R) andR, that is, the sensitivity of the perceived performance (i.e., E(α|R)) to the estimated performance (i.e.,R). Assuming that investors allocate funds based on the perceived performance, this relation is directly related to the flow-performance sensitivity analysis that we examine in our empirical analysis.
The baseline values for θ 0 (mean level of idiosyncratic variance for zero-alpha funds) and θ h (mean level of idiosyncratic variance for positive-alpha funds) are both set at 0.1 2 , indicating an annualized idiosyncratic risk of 10% for the average fund for either group of funds. Figure 1 shows how changes in θ 0 and θ h (the changed θ 0 and θ h are denoted byθ 0 andθ h ) affect the sensitivity of E(α|R) (i.e., perceived performance) toR (i.e., estimated performance). We set θ 0 and θ h at values that are consistent with our data.
8
The top two panels in Figure 1 show that the perceived performance becomes significantly less sensitive to the estimated performance when θ 0 is raised from 0.1
In our empirical analysis, we use cross-sectional return dispersion (more specifically, the inter-quartile range for the cross-section of alphas) to proxy for √ θ 0 . The peak and trough level for the time-series of our measure are 38% and 4%, 9 respectively, suggesting that a 100% (=0.2/0.1) change in √ θ 0 is not unusual. Given this change in θ 0 , the change in the sensitivity of the perceived performance to the estimated performance is substantial. For example, when Π 0 = 0.8 and by simply using the boundary values of the perceived performance (i.e., the values of the perceived performance when the estimated performance equals zero and 0.15) to calibrate the linear relation between the perceived performance and the estimated performance, the slope coefficient that captures the sensitivity of the perceived performance to the estimated performance changes from 0.007/0.15 (at θ 0 = 0.1 2 ) to 0.004/0.15 (atθ 0 = 0.2 2 ), implying a 43% (= 0.003/0.007) reduction in slope.
8 The average level of return dispersion ranges from 7.4% to 11.0%, depending on the benchmark factor model we use. We thus set √ θ 0 and √ θ h at 10%. 9 This is based on the CAPM-adjusted alpha. E(α|R) in our model) to the estimated performance (i.e.,R in our model). We plot the perceived performance against the estimated performance based on our model presented in Section 2.1. The baseline levels of θ 0 (mean level of idiosyncratic variance for zero-alpha funds) and θ h (mean level of idiosyncratic variance for positive-alpha funds) are both set at 0.1 2 . Alternative levels of θ 0 and θ h (i.e.,θ 0 andθ h ) are set at (0.2 2 , 0.1 2 ) (top-left and top-right panel), (0.2 2 , 0.2 2 ) (bottom-left panel), and (0.1 2 , 0.2 2 ) (bottom-right panel). The fraction of zero-alpha funds (Π 0 ) is set at 0.9 for the top-right panel and at 0.8 for all the other panels.
A closer inspection of the top two panels in Figure 1 reveals that while both the discount of large alpha estimates (e.g., estimated performance around 0.15) and the markup of small alpha estimates (e.g., estimated performance around zero) contribute to the change in slope, the former channel represents a more significant contribution, highlighting the importance of Proposition 2 (in particular, ∂E(α|R) ∂θ 0 < 0). Notice that this depends on the range of the alpha estimates that we include in the graphs. Given that a 15% annual alpha estimate is not an uncommon observation in the cross-section of funds, we use 15% as the limit for the alpha estimate for our graphs. The inclusion of even larger alpha estimates will make our results (i.e., the reduction in slope) stronger.
The bottom-left panel shows that when both θ 0 and θ h are increased by the same factor, the sensitivity of the perceived performance to the estimated performance still becomes lower, while the bottom-right panels shows that when only θ h is increased, this sensitivity becomes higher. The pattern shown in the bottom-right panel is consistent with Proposition 2 (in particular,
Combining it with the bottom-left panel, we see that when both θ 0 and θ h are increased by the same factor, while the increase in θ h increases the sensitivity of the perceived performance to the estimated performance (as shown in the bottom-right panel), the same increase in θ 0 reduces this sensitivity by an amount that more than offsets the increase, resulting in an overall reduction in the sensitivity.
The bottom-left panel shows that when θ 0 = θ h , an increase in θ 0 (and hence an equal increase in θ h ) lowers the sensitivity of the perceived performance to the estimated performance. This result holds true in general in our model (i.e., ∂E(α|R) ∂θ 0 < 0 when θ 0 = θ h ), although we do not formally establish this as a proposition in the previous section.
Overall, our calibration results show the economic importance of θ 0 and θ h in affecting the sensitivity of the perceived performance to the estimated performance. The results also highlight the differential impact of θ 0 and θ h on this sensitivity: while an increase in θ 0 lowers the sensitivity, an increase in θ h implies the opposite pattern. It is therefore crucial to distinguish between θ 0 and θ h when we study flowperformance sensitivity. In our empirical analysis, we use a measure of cross-sectional return dispersion to proxy for √ θ 0 . We provide simulation evidence that shows that our measure of cross-sectional return dispersion has near perfect correlation with √ θ 0 from a time-series perspective.
Measuring Return Dispersion
Our model shows that investors' predictions about alpha are influenced by crosssectional dispersion of returns and are distinctly different between θ 0 and θ h . While a larger θ 0 implies a more aggressive discount of funds with large alphas (and hence a lower flow-performance sensitivity), a larger θ h implies the opposite. It is therefore crucial to have a measure of θ 0 that is not contaminated by θ h . This is challenging. Ideally, we group funds into performance categories and calculate the within group IVOL -but how do we do the initial classification?
We propose a simple and intuitive proxy for √ θ 0 based on the cross-section of alphas. In particular, we use the interquartile range (IQR) of the cross-section of alphas. Later we define alpha as either the mean excess return over a simple benchmark (either the risk-free rate or the market) or the factor-model adjusted alpha over the past year.
10 Our focus on annual alpha is consistent with the literature on flow-performance sensitivity. Compared to higher frequency alphas, it also allows a sufficient amount of time for investors to absorb information in the cross-section. To summarize, at the end of each month t, we obtain the IQR of the cross-section of alphas estimated over the past year. We use this monthly measure of return dispersion to predict future flow-performance sensitivity in our empirical analysis.
We believe that the return dispersion of mutual funds is the type of information that investors take into account. It measures the range of performance among funds that are best described as mediocre and are thus more likely to be identified as zeroalpha funds.
In Appendix B, we provide simulation-based evidence to further justify our use of the IQR. In particular, we simulate the panel of returns for a cross-section of funds that are drawn from two (or three) subpopulations, with the idiosyncratic risk for funds within each subpopulation following a separate inverse gamma distribution. Moreover, the means of these inverse gamma distributions are time-varying. When the majority of funds are drawn from the zero-alpha population, we show that the IQR for the entire cross-section of funds closely tracks the time-varying mean level of idiosyncratic risk for funds with a zero alpha. Indeed, the contemporaneous correlation is close to one under various parameterizations of our model.
The intuition for the performance of IQR in tracking the average level of idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds is straightforward. As shown in Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002) , range-based statistics provide a good approximation to time-varying volatilities. However, in our context, extreme returns are more likely to be generated by funds with non-zero alphas, so range-based statistics that depend on extreme returns (e.g., maximum minus minimum) are not very useful in approximating the average level of idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds.
11 In contrast, range-based statistics that rule out extreme returns (e.g., IQR) are more likely to work well since the majority of funds are assumed to have a zero alpha. One additional benefit in using the IQR is that it is robust to outliers (both extreme underperformers and extreme outperformers) in the cross-section.
Model Implications
We cast our model within a Bayesian framework where Bayesian investors, endowed with priors (governed by θ 0 and θ h ) on the levels of idiosyncratic risk taken by zeroalpha and positive-alpha funds, try to estimate fund alphas through the posterior distributions of fund alphas. How do we test our model predictions against the data?
First of all, it is well documented that mutual fund investors have a certain degree of recency bias by responding more to current alphas. We also construct our measure of return dispersion based on recent alphas. As a result, we have a time-varying measure (θ 0,t ) that captures return dispersion by time t. Conditional on θ 0,t , our model implies that investors should take θ 0,t into account to adjust fund alphas, resulting in a certain degree of flow-performance sensitivity (termed s t+1 ) that can be estimated using data in the future (i.e., at time t + 1). Our empirical analysis therefore studies how θ 0,t predicts s t+1 .
Notice that we are taking an empirical Bayes perspective to test our model's implications in that we are assuming that investors directly learn about key parameters in their priors from the data. This is not a crucial assumption of our model. In fact, we can rewrite our model within a frequentist framework where investors simultaneously estimate individual fund alphas and the distributions of idiosyncratic risk. However, given the close connection between return dispersion and the distributions of idiosyncratic risk, the main prediction of such a frequentist framework would be the same as that for our model. We therefore rely on our Bayesian framework to provide insights, but point out that our model implications hold true in general. For more details on the application of empirical Bayes methods to performance evaluation, see Harvey and Liu (2017b) .
3 Flow-performance Sensitivity Conditional on Return Dispersion
Data and Variables
Our data are drawn from the CRSP Survior-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database from January 1980 to December 2016. Following the previous literature, we focus on domestic equity mutual funds and exclude sector funds using the CRSP objective code. We also exclude index funds and funds that on average have less than 80% of their holdings in stocks. We further apply several filters to mitigate omission bias (Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2001 ) and incubation bias (Evans, 2010) . In particular, we exclude fund return observations that are reported prior to the year of fund organization. We also exclude fund observations before funds pass the $5 million threshold for assets under management (all subsequent observations, including those that fall under the $5 million threshold in the future, are included).
We obtain fund expense ratio, turnover rate, fund age, and total net assets (TNA) directly from the CRSP database. Combined with fund returns, we calculate annual percentage flow between month t + 1 and month t + 12 as:
where T N A i,t is fund i's TNA at the end of month t, and R i,t+1→t+12 is fund i's annual return (i.e., between month t + 1 and month t + 12). We focus on annual fund flows to avoid seasonal (in particular, quarterly) fluctuations in fund flows (Kamstra, Kramer, Levi, and Wermers, 2017) . While this introduces autocorrelations in regression residuals in our panel regressions where we have overlapping dependent variables (i.e., annual fund flows) at the monthly frequency, we focus on standard errors that are clustered by both fund and time (i.e., double clustered standard errors) to obtain correct inferences.
Consistent with the standard practice detailed in the literature, we focus on alphas estimated over the past year in our empirical analysis. However, there are many alternatives as to how to best estimate alpha. While simple benchmarks seem to be most consistent with investor flows (Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2016) and produce less biased assessment of fund performance (Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz, 2012, Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2015) , papers in the performance evaluation literature routinely use the Fama-French three-factor or the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model.
We use a spectrum of alpha estimates to make sure that our results are not driven by the benchmark model we use. For our main results, we focus on the simple market-adjusted alpha (i.e., fund return minus market return) and the CAPM-adjusted alpha (which allows for differing betas against the market return). In Appendix C, we report results on the risk-free-adjusted alpha (i.e., fund excess return) and alphas based on the Fama-French three-factor model and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. For the simple market-adjusted alpha and the risk-free-adjusted alpha, we use fund returns in the past year (i.e., between month t − 11 and t) to estimate fund alpha up to time t. For CAPM and multi-factor models, we first estimate risk loadings based on data for the past five years.
12 We then adjust fund returns in the past year to benchmark factors using the estimated risk loadings.
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Let the estimated alpha for fund i by time t be α i,t . Return dispersion at time t (Disp t ), which is our main variable of interest, is defined as the inter-quartile range for the cross-section of α i,t at time t.
We include several other controls in our regression analysis. We first define the OLS standard error for fund i's alpha estimate (Std(α i,t−11→t ) i,t ). When the simple market-adjusted alpha model or the risk-free-adjusted alpha model is used, Std(α i,t−11→t ) i,t is simply defined as the standard deviation of the adjusted fund returns over the past year. When CAPM or multi-factor models are used, Std(α i,t−11→t ) i,t is the standard error for alpha estimate over the past five years. In our regression analysis, we interact Std(α i,t−11→t ) i,t with fund alpha to control for the uncertainty in estimating fund i's alpha based on its time-series information alone.
The other controls we include are consistent with existing literature, such as Franzoni and Schmalz (2017) and Starks and Sun (2016) . In particular, fund volatility (V OL i,t ) is the standard deviation of fund excess returns over the past year, and style flow (StyleF low i,t ) is the average flow of the investment objective class. We also control for expense ratio (ExpRatio), turnover (T urnover), log TNA (LogT N A), and log fund age (LogAge). All variables involving fund returns (i.e., α i,t , Std(α i,t−11→t ) i,t , and V OL i,t ) are annualized. We also winsorize fund flows and the control variables (i.e., ExpRatio, T urnover, LogT N A, LogAge, V OL, and StyleF low) at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
To control for the variables proposed by Franzoni and Schmalz (2017) and Starks and Sun (2016), we follow them to construct the market state (State, Franzoni and Schmalz, 2017) and policy uncertainty (P olicyU ncer, Starks and Sun, 2016). In particular, we define a quarterly indicator variable that equals one if the quarterly market excess return is considered as mediocre (i.e., no larger than 5% in magnitude) and zero otherwise. We then take the average of this indicator variable over the past year to obtain the annual market state. Following Starks and Sun (2016), we obtain the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU) from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) . 12 We require that a fund has at least 36 monthly observations to accurately estimate risk loadings. 13 Benchmark factors are obtained from Ken French's on-line data library.
Results
Summary Statistics
TO BE ADDED. Figure 2 plots the time-series of our return dispersion measures, together with the VIX index and NBER recession dates. We plot two series of return dispersion. One is based on CAPM adjusted alpha, and the other corresponds to the Fama-FrenchCarhart four-factor adjusted alpha. Figure 2 shows that VIX is distinguishly different from our return dispersion measures, despite its positive correlation with them (the correlation coefficient between VIX and the CAPM-adjusted/four-factor model adjusted return dispersion is 0.35/0.32). In particular, while the market is highly volatile during 1988 and 2009 based on VIX, our measures of return dispersion are relatively low during those periods compared to the rest of the sample.
Time-series of Return Dispersion
Between the two series of return dispersion, we see several interesting patterns. First, the level for the four-factor adjusted return dispersion is higher than that for the CAPM-adjusted dispersion. This can be explained by the fact that differences in funds' loadings on the three benchmark factors (other than the market factor) in the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model contribute to the cross-sectional return dispersion under CAPM. Second, while the return dispersion for the CAPM-adjusted alpha during the 1999-2001 tech bubble is significantly higher than other periods, this is not case for the Fama-French-Carhart adjusted alpha. Despite some of the differences in the time-series of the two measures of return dispersion, we study both (and a few other alternative measures) in our empirical analysis and show that our results are robust to the benchmark model that we use to estimate alphas.
Figure 2: Time-series of return dispersion. For each month t in our data, we calculate return dispersion as the interquartile range of the cross-section of fund alphas for the previous year (i.e., from month t − 11 to month t). Fund alpha is calculated as either the CAPM adjusted alpha (solid line) or the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor adjusted alpha (dash-dotted line). We also plot the time-series of VIX, which is calculated as the average of the daily VIX over the same period (i.e., from month t − 11 to month t). Shaded areas are NBER recession dates.
Main Results
The main prediction of our model is that the flow-performance sensitivity is decreasing in return dispersion. We test this prediction by running the following regression specification:
where F low i,t+1→t+12 is the annual percentage fund flow in the following year, Disp t is cross-sectional alpha dispersion measured over the past year, α i,t and Std(α i,t−11→t ) i,t are the alpha estimate and its standard error, Alter t includes either market state (State, Franzoni and Schmalz, 2017) or policy uncertainty (P olicyU ncer, Starks and Sun, 2016), Controls i,t include log TNA, expense ratio, turnover ratio, log fund age, volatility of fund returns, and the average flow of the investment objective class. All independent variables are measured using data in the past except for the average flow of the investment objective class, which is measured contemporaneously with fund flow. In our regression analysis, we include both fund and month fixed effects. Standard errors are also clustered by both fund and month. Table 1 reports the regression results when alpha is calculated as the difference between fund return and the market return, and Table 2 reports the results for the CAPM-adjusted alpha.
Focusing on Table 1 , in column (1), the positive coefficient on α is consistent with the previous literature that documents a positive relation between past alphas and future flows. By interacting return dispersion with past alpha, column (2) shows a negative relation between return dispersion and flow-performance sensitivity. It is highly significant, both statistically (t-stat = −7.18) and economically. To think about its economic significance, the mean and standard deviation of return dispersion for the model in Table 1 are 11.02% and 5.97%, respectively. This implies a mean flowperformance sensitivity of 1.85−2.94×11.02% = 1.53 and a decrease of 2.94×5.97% = 0.18 corresponding to a one-standard increase in return dispersion. Hence, a onestandard deviation increase in return dispersion reduces flow-performance sensitivity by 0.18/1.53 = 12%.
When additional controls are added, our results remain significant. In particular, when we add in the interaction term between a fund's alpha estimate and its standard error (i.e., Std(α)), we see that Std(α) negatively affects flow-performance sensitivity. This is consistent with our Proposition 3. However, this can also be explained by the fact that investors not only care about alphas in mean, but also their standard errors as in appraisal ratios or t-statistics for alphas. We therefore do not take a stand on which interpretation is the dominating one in explaining our results associated with Std(α). More importantly, our main results on return dispersion are robust to the inclusion of Std(α). Our results also survive when market state as in Franzoni and Schmalz (2017) or policy uncertainty as in Starks and Sun (2016) is included in our regressions. Table 2 shows similar results to Table 1 when we use CAPM-adjusted alphas. To calibrate the economic significance of our results, the mean and standard deviation of return dispersion for the model in Table 2 is 9.94% and 4.51%, respectively. This implies a mean flow-performance sensitivity of 2.02 − 4.02 × 9.94% = 1.62 and a decrease of 4.02 × 4.51% = 0.18 corresponding to a one-standard increase in return dispersion. Hence, a one-standard deviation increase in return dispersion reduces flow-performance sensitivity by 0.18/1.62 = 11%, which is similar to what we have in Table 1 .
In Appendix C, we report additional results that correspond to the risk-free rate adjusted alpha (Table 4) , the Fama-French three-factor adjusted alpha (Table 5) , and the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted alpha (Table 6 ). Our results are consistent. Moreover, the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in return dispersion reduces flow-performance sensitivity by 11%, 17%, and 12%, respectively. 14 Overall, across different benchmark factor models, the economic impact of a onestandard deviation increase in return dispersion on flow-performance sensitivity is around 11%-17%.
14 The means and standard deviations of return dispersion are 11.02% and 5.97% (risk-free adjusted alpha), 7.78% and 2.48% (Fama-French three-factor adjusted alpha), and 7.41% and 2.28% (Fama-French four-factor adjusted alpha). Given these summary statistics, the impact of a onestandard deviation increase in return dispersion can be calculated based on the results reported in Table 4 , 5, and 6. Regression results on flow-performance sensitivity when alpha is estimated as the mean difference between fund return and market return. The dependent variable is the annual percentage fund flow between month t + 1 and t + 12. Explanatory variables include fund alpha estimate (α), cross-sectional return dispersion (Disp), standard error for alpha (Std(α)), expense ratio (ExpRatio), turnover ratio (T urnover), log TNA (LogT N A), log fund age (LogAge), return volatility (V OL), and average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low). Market state (Franzoni and Schmalz, 2017) and policy uncertainty (Starks and Sun, 2016) are defined in Section 3.1. All explanatory variables at time t are based on data before (including) month t, except for the average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low), which is constructed contemporaneously with the fund flow. For all regression models, we include both fund and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by fund and month. We present the t-statistics in the parentheses. * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) Table 2 : Flow-performance Sensitivity: CAPM Adjusted Alpha
Regression results on flow-performance sensitivity when alpha is estimated based on the CAPM. The dependent variable is the annual percentage fund flow between month t + 1 and t + 12. Explanatory variables include fund alpha estimate (α), cross-sectional return dispersion (Disp), standard error for alpha (Std(α)), expense ratio (ExpRatio), turnover ratio (T urnover), log TNA (LogT N A), log fund age (LogAge), return volatility (V OL), and average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low). Market state (Franzoni and Schmalz, 2017) and policy uncertainty (Starks and Sun, 2016) are defined in Section 3.1. All explanatory variables at time t are based on data before (including) month t, except for the average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low), which is constructed contemporaneously with the fund flow.
For all regression models, we include both fund and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by fund and month. We present the t-statistics in the parentheses. * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) 
Conclusion
How should investors evaluate fund managers? The literature has made important progress in answering this question, highlighting, among others, three important issues that any active mutual fund investor should be concerned about. They are: 1. the majority of fund managers seem unskilled once luck is taken into account (the multiple testing literature); 2. the Type I vs Type II error tradeoff in classifying funds into distinct performance groups (the literature on categorizing funds); and 3. the use of cross-sectional information in learning about the performance of a particular fund (the Bayesian performance evaluation literature).
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Given this extensive literature on what investors should do, we ask a different question: are investors actually taking the above issues into account in their capital allocation decisions? To answer this question, we first present a model that provides a simple link between return dispersion and manager actions. In periods of high return dispersion, it should be especially difficult to separate good funds from bad funds. Our empirical results suggest that investors take dispersion into account. Investors are much more likely to discount good performance when making an allocation to a mutual fund in an environment with high return dispersion.
Mutual fund flow-performance sensitivity offers an ideal testing ground for the theories developed by the prior literature on performance evaluation. Evaluating which theories are consistent with investor behavior is important as it provides strong guidance to the next generation of performance evaluation models. 
Similarly, one can show that:
, Using the fact that
we have:
< 0), we have:
Hence, whenR >R † , we have
B Return Dispersion as a Proxy for 
) and different measures of return dispersion. We simulate M = 30 years of monthly data. Assuming a two-group structure for the cross-section of funds (with a probability mass of Π 0 for zero-alpha funds and Π h for positive-alpha funds), at the beginning of year m, θ 0,m (mean idiosyncratic risk for zero-alpha funds) and θ h,m (mean idiosyncratic risk for positive-alpha funds) are randomly and independently generated by 0.1 × (1 + x) , where the variable x is uniformly distributed on (−0.5, 0.5). Conditional on θ 0,m and θ h,m , we first simulate idiosyncratic risks for the cross-section of funds (assuming N = 1, 000 funds in the cross-section) by drawing independently from the inversegamma distribution IG(λ = 2, θ 0,m ) for zero-alpha funds and IG(λ = 2, θ 0,m ) for positive-alpha funds. Conditional on the simulated idiosyncratic risks for the crosssection of funds, we then simulate individual fund returns over the year by drawing independently from a normal distribution with a mean of zero for zero-alpha funds and α h for positive-alpha funds. We then calculate three statistics to measure crosssectional return dispersion for year m: inter-quartile range (iqr m ), standard deviation (stdev m ), and range between the maximum and the minimum (range m ). Finally, we calculate the time-series correlation between θ 0,m ( θ h,m ) and the three dispersion statistics. We simulate 1,000 times and report the average correlations. A similar procedure is applied to the case with three fund groups (with a probability mass of Π 0 for zero-alpha funds, Π −h for negative-alpha funds, and Π h for negative-alpha funds).
Panel A: Two Groups (Π 0 and Π h ) Regression results on flow-performance sensitivity when alpha is calculated as the mean fund excess return. The dependent variable is the annual percentage fund flow between month t+1 and t+12. Explanatory variables include fund alpha estimate (α), cross-sectional return dispersion (Disp), standard error for alpha (Std(α)), expense ratio (ExpRatio), turnover ratio (T urnover), log TNA (LogT N A), log fund age (LogAge), return volatility (V OL), and average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low). Market state (Franzoni and Schmalz, 2017) and policy uncertainty (Starks and Sun, 2016) are defined in Section 3.1. All explanatory variables at time t are based on data before (including) month t, except for the average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low), which is constructed contemporaneously with the fund flow.
(1) Regression results on flow-performance sensitivity when alpha is estimated with the Fama-French three-factor model. The dependent variable is the annual percentage fund flow between month t + 1 and t + 12. Explanatory variables include fund alpha estimate (α), cross-sectional return dispersion (Disp), standard error for alpha (Std(α)), expense ratio (ExpRatio), turnover ratio (T urnover), log TNA (LogT N A), log fund age (LogAge), return volatility (V OL), and average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low). Market state (Franzoni and Schmalz, 2017) and policy uncertainty (Starks and Sun, 2016) are defined in Section 3.1. All explanatory variables at time t are based on data before (including) month t, except for the average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low), which is constructed contemporaneously with the fund flow. For all regression models, we include both fund and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by fund and month. We present the t-statistics in the parentheses. * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) Regression results on flow-performance sensitivity when alpha is estimated with the Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. The dependent variable is the annual percentage fund flow between month t + 1 and t + 12. Explanatory variables include fund alpha estimate (α), cross-sectional return dispersion (Disp), standard error for alpha (Std(α)), expense ratio (ExpRatio), turnover ratio (T urnover), log TNA (LogT N A), log fund age (LogAge), return volatility (V OL), and average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low). Market state (Franzoni and Schmalz, 2017) and policy uncertainty (Starks and Sun, 2016) are defined in Section 3.1. All explanatory variables at time t are based on data before (including) month t, except for the average flow of the investment objective class (StyleF low), which is constructed contemporaneously with the fund flow. For all regression models, we include both fund and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by fund and month. We present the t-statistics in the parentheses. * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
